Introduction
Logic is about finished proofs and not about the process of finding a proof. The derivation rules of a logic define inductively what is derivable. The rules do not tell us how we should find or construct such a derivation, but they give us a procedure of checking whether an alleged proof is indeed well-formed. Of course, the derivation rules are chosen (by Gentzen) in such a way that they represent 'obviously correct' reasoning steps, but that does not mean that mathematicians actually reason in this way. When proving a mathematical theorem, one makes intermediates claims, leaving parts temporarily unspecified and exploring the possibilities. When the proof is 'finished', it is written up in a style that corresponds -at least in spirit -to natural deduction. Looking more closely at the process of proof finding, one observes that also in that phase, the proof-steps are intended to be correct in terms of natural deduction. So, there should be a correctness criterion for 'unfinished proofs', where some parts may be left open or unspecified, but the steps that have been made are correct.
Unfinished proofs appear prominently in systems for interactive theorem proving, where the computer assists the user in finding proofs: the user types in tactics that guide the system through the proof-construction. An important issue for interactive systems is how to communicate to the user what the present 'proof state' (the state of the 'unfinished proof') is, in order for the user to make a sensible next step. To describe precisely what these interactive theorem provers actually operate on, we want to give a precise meaning to 'unfinished proofs' and 'proof states'. The following issues arise: In this paper we will be answering the first question, taking inspiration from the second one, because we know -intuitively and from experience with interactive theorem proversquite well what we want to be able to do. Most of the work in the area of incomplete constructions is done in type theory where a number of systems of open terms in (dependently) typed λ-calculus exist [16, 10, 4, 12, 9, 6] . They have evolved from existing typing systems (the Barendregt cube [2] , ECC [7] , Martin-Löf type theory, etc.) when their application in (interactive) theorem proving required formalization of the notion of incomplete term. TypeLab [16] is based on ECC and represents unknown terms by meta-variables that are equipped with explicit substitutions. Each meta-variable is given a context and a type in that context and the idea is that the meta-variable stands for a well-typed term of the given type in that context. The approach in OLEG [10] is to treat meta-variables declarations as part of the term. This is done by introducing special binders that locally declare meta-variables. In this way the position of the binder naturally expresses the context in which the meta-variable should be solved. Computations with terms containing meta-variable declarations are limited as such terms are not allowed to leak into types. Bognar [4] generalizes the concept of context as used in the untyped λ-calculus [3] and introduces the λ[ ]-cube. Along with the local declarations of meta-variables, these systems have explicit operators for instantiation.
For other related work the reader is referred to the papers on λProlog, Isabelle and Twelf and the work of Miller [11] , Paulson [13] and Pfenning [14] . 
Motivating Examples

An Unfinished Proof with Backward Proof Construction.
We start with the goal of proving A→C from hypotheses A→B→C and A→B (1). We solve this goal by the rule for introduction of implication (2) . This introduces a new hypothesis A. In (3) we have used the hypothesis A→B→C to deduce C by implication-elimination of the new goals A and B. The first one is solved in (4) by the assumption A and the second by introducing a new goal A and eliminating the assumption A→B. Finally (5) we solve A trivially by the hypothesis A and we have a complete derivation of A→C from A→B→C and A→B.
An Unfinished Proof with a Forward Proof Construction.
We proceed forward by using elimination rules on the hypotheses. In (2) we have used the A and A→B to obtain B which is used in (3) to deduce B→C. Then we must infer B again and use it to derive C at step (4) . Note that in step (4) we would like to be able to reuse the already proven result B instead of having to derive it again, but natural deduction does not allow this. The 'open place' y in the example has a different role than a variable: we seek an value for it and we will not abstract over it. We will call these open places meta-variables. A term containing a meta-variable will be called an open term.
Convention 1
To clearly distinguish variables from meta-variables, we will underline meta-variables, so y denotes a meta-variable and y is different from y.
Delaying the Choice of the Witness for an Existential Quantifier and Computing with Open Terms.
In order to prove an existential formula ∃x.A(x) constructively one usually needs to find a term t (called also a witness) and prove A(t). Often the choice of the term is not obvious and one may want to leave it open while continuing with the proof. This can be achieved by using a metavariable for t.
In this example, the witness meta-variable n should actually depend on y, because we want to be able to instantiate n with y. If we do that in the last proof (4), y becomes an unbound variable, so that is not correct. Hence we have to be careful with the definition of instantiation. As we can see, the problem occurs because reduction and instantiation do not commute.
To prove the correctness of instantiation, we would need that instantiation must commute with the derivation rules (Lemma 13). This property depends essentially on the commutation of instantiation and reduction. It is depicted in the diagram below, together with its instance to the above example (where it fails).
The solution is to record the dependency of a meta-variable on other variables by writing n [y] . An alternative solution is to delay substitutions by using explicit substitutions. Then we would have, e.g.
= n for a meta-variable. This approach is taken by [12] and [9] . We follow the first approach, also taken by [16] . As an illustration on the right we redo the above example, but now with dependencies of meta-variables recorded.
Using Meta-variables to Represent Unknown Formulas.
Suppose we are in arithmetics. The 'usual' induction principle is expressed by the formula Ind 1 = ∀P :N →Prop.P (0)∧∀n.P (n)→P (n+1) → ∀n.P (n). The 'courseof-value' induction principle is expressed by the formula
Suppose we want to prove that Ind 1 implies Ind 2 . We will show how meta-variables can be used to prove this implication without having to make guesses 'out of the blue'. After an obvious backward step we have the initial open proof shown on the right (P < (n) abbreviates ∀k < n.P (k)).
It is clear that we need to use the hypothesis Ind 1 . To do that we have to eliminate the universal quantifier. Since we do not want to make guesses, we delay the choice and introduce a meta-variable B for the unknown predicate.
An obvious step towards solving the goal is to reduce it to these three subgoals:
(1)
The idea of course is to use (1) and (2) with implication elimination to obtain ∀n.B[n] from which using (3) we would derive ∀n.P (n). To discard goal (3), it is sufficient to define B[n] := P (n) ∧ C[n] where C[n] is a fresh meta-variable of type Prop. After the instantiation goals (1) and (2) look like this:
Goal (2) is the hardest to solve. However without much creativity we observe that we can replace it by the following two goals:
Analyzing goal (2b) shows that we are in the following situation.
∀n.
and it is now not difficult to see that C[n] can be taken to be the formula P < (n) and the remaining goals (1) and (2a) are easily provable. Hence the final solution for the predicate B[n] is P (n) ∧ P < (n) or equivalently, ∀k ≤ n.P (k).
Open Higher Order Predicate Logic
We now give a formal definition of higher order predicate logic with open terms and open proofs, o-HOL. As usual, we first define the language, then the derivation rules and then the notion of derivability. We show that o-HOL is conservative over HOL, ordinary higher order predicate logic [2, 5] . This means that, if we have derived the higher order formula A in o-HOL without unfinished subproofs, then A is derivable in HOL.
Most of o-HOL is the same as HOL, but we present it nevertheless. 
Definition 2 (Language of o-HOL
where A(Σ) is the set of undischarged assumptions of Σ.
The rule (claim) represents an unknown derivation of A from B 1 , . . . , B n . The hypotheses of the unknown derivation need to be specified explicitly, for example, because we need to check side conditions on assumptions in the rest of the rules (and these refer to the leaves of a derivation). This explicit representation of the hypotheses also allows us to represent the forward steps that one may want to do. Sometimes in derivations we will use the symbol ' ?' to denote the (claim) rule.
As usual, in the →-I rule, the A-leaves that are labelled with i (notation [A] i ) are discharged, so they are no longer assumptions. Similarly, the A-leaves in the ∃-E rule are discharged.
In the conversion rule, = β is defined in terms of
The substitution used here extends immediately to terms with meta-variables:
We always work modulo α-conversion. Hence we adopt the variable convention (also called 'Barendregt convention') that we always assume all bound variables (BV) to be different and different from the free variables (FV).
A derivation tree in o-HOL is the same as a derivation in HOL, except for the fact that we can now also have (claim) nodes in the tree. In the notion of derivability we also have to take the 'open parts' of the derivation tree (the (claim) nodes) into account. We will call these goals.
It is allowed that variables occur free in the goals. If a variable x occurs free in a specific formula in a derivation Σ, it may be bound in Σ (by a ∀-I rule or a ∃-E rule) or it may be free in Σ. We define these notions explicitly, as it is important for our interpretations of goals. 
Definition 6 (Bound Occurrences of a Variables in a Derivation). Let Σ be a derivation and A a formula occurring in Σ with x ∈ FV(A). We say that x ∈ FV(A) is bound in
B i ∃-E B
with x free in all the formulas in the derivation between A and B (inclusive).
with x free in all the formulas in the derivation between C and A (inclusive).
So, the notion of 'x ∈ FV(A) is bound in Σ' is about a specific occurrence of A in the derivation Σ. It is defined by induction on Σ. Note that x ∈ FV(A) may be bound for one occurrence of A and free for another. The problem of managing the free and bound variables and their scopes is crucial for solving the problems of instantiation and computation (see 2.4).
Definition 7 (Goals in a Derivation).
A goal in o-HOL is a judgement of the form
x 1 :σ 1 , . . . , x n :σ n , A 1 , . . . , A n ❀ B,
Definition 8 (Derivability in o-HOL). Given a set of formulas Γ , a set of goals G and a formula B, we say that B is derivable from
Γ ; G in o-HOL, notation Γ ; G i B,
if there is a derivation Σ with conclusion B, (non-discharged) assumptions in Γ and all goals of Σ in G.
An important property of HOL is that the derivation rules are compatible with substitution. Hence derivations and derivability are compatible with substitution:
if Γ A with derivation Σ, then Γ [t/x] A[t/x] with derivation Σ[t/x].
For o-HOL we have the same properties, where we have to take note that in a goal x 1 :σ 1 , . . . , x n :σ n , A 1 , . . . , A n ❀ B, the variables x 1 , . . . , x n are bound in A 1 , . . . , A n , B. Hence, we do not substitute for these variables but rename them appropriately. 
Lemma 9 (Compatibility of Derivability and Substitution in o-HOL).
If Γ ; G i A, then Γ [t/x]; G[t/x] i A[t/x].
D(x) for the first and A(x), C; A ❀ B(x), C ❀ B(x)→D(x) D(x) for the second. Note what happens if we substitute t for x in the two derivations.
An important operation on derivations is instantiation (choosing a value for a meta-variable). Therefore, an equally important property for o-HOL is the compatibility of the derivation rules with instantiation of meta-variables. We first give a precise definition of instantiation.
Definition 11. For n[y : A] : B a meta-variable and t : B a term, we call {n[y : A] := t} an instantiation (of n[y] by t). The instantiation binds the occurrences of y in t and t may contain also variables different from those in y.
Since the variables y are considered bound, the following two instantiations by our convention are considered identical:
The application of instantiation is defined immediately for all terms. The only interesting cases are the meta-variable applications. Note that the instantiations have to be applied heriditarily (also to q in the first case), because q may contain n, so for example )(g a (f a) ). Adding parameters to meta-variables is enough to record the relevant substitutions that might be executed over the metavariable (see 2.4). This approach, also used in [16] , eliminates the need to introduce explicit substitutions as a mechanism for postponing the substitutions over meta-variables.
We sometimes have to rename bound variables in derivations before performing an instantiation. This problem is not really new for o-HOL, because it already appears in HOL (when performing a substitution). To make our point clear we treat the following example.
Example 12. Consider a derivation Σ of (P n[ ]) and a derivation Θ of (P n [x] ), where Θ and Σ do not contain a free x in their assumptions. We can do a ∀-introduction and we can perform an instantiation, {n[ ] := x+y} on Σ, respectively {n[x] := x + y} on Θ. In the first derivation, to perform the instantiation, we first have to rename the bound variable x to z.
Instantiation is compatible with derivations in o-HOL. The proof is by induction on the structure of the derivation trees:
Corollary 14 (o-HOL is conservative over HOL).
Let Γ and A be a context and a formula in HOL respectively.
= x k } be instantiations for these meta-variables with fresh variables of appropriate sort. If we perform all these instantiations on Σ, we obtain a derivation Σ of Γ ; ∅ i A and this derivation contains no more meta-variables. But then Σ is also a derivation in HOL, because it contains no applications of the (claim) rule and all the terms occurring in it are HOL-terms. ✷
Beyond Open Derivations
The logic o-HOL defined above gives us the answer to the problem of what an incomplete derivation is. Interactive theorem proving is however not only about individual derivations. Often we encounter situations where more advanced applications are needed:
1. Proof reuse. Consider example 2 in Section 2. There we had to prove the same formula twice because we needed it in two different places. One would probably want to avoid this unnecessary effort by reusing proofs that have already been done. 2. 'Scratch-paper' mechanism. We may also wish to explore our knowledge to come to good instantiations, or to reject potential instantiations. For example, suppose we want to prove the formula ∃x.ϕ(x) ∧ (x < 2) from ∀x.ϕ(x)→(0 < x) (see (1)). From the assumption and the formula that we want to prove we can derive some properties that x must have (2).
From the conclusion of this extra derivation we may conclude that the only possible instantiation for x is {x := 1} (assuming that x is a natural number).
This simple example illustrates the need to sometimes pause the construction of the 'main' derivation, do some side computations or inferences within its scope and then come back with the results.
A general problem that emerges from the examples above is that open derivations do not (yet) capture the notion of proof state. The system o-HOL is just about individual open derivations. A proof state is, intuitively, a 'connected' set of derivations. We will use type theory to formalize the notion of proof state.
The Curry-Howard Formulas-as-Types Embedding
The Curry-Howard formulas-as-types embedding maps derivations of the logic, in our case HOL, to proof terms of an appropriate type theory, in our case λHOL. The type system λHOL has two 'universes': Type, the type of all domains (D in the logic), and Prop, the type of all formulas. (Hence Prop : Type.) We do not give a definition of the type system λHOL but refer the reader to [5] or [1] .
A central point in this mapping is that all elements of the language and all the variables in a HOL derivation can be systematically given bindings that form a context in type theory and that the derivation itself can be coded by a term which is typable in that context.
The type theory λHOL represents the logic HOL faithfully, because we have a soundness and a completeness result, stated as follows. (We use λ to denote derivability in the type theory and L to denote derivability in the logic.)
A, where Γ L declares the required parts of the language of HOL. The derivation rules are as follows.
Γ λ Ok is the judgement that Γ is well-formed.
The type system o-λHOL enjoys all the nice meta-theoretic properties, like Subject Reduction, Confluence and Strong Normalization. with m a fresh meta-variable. Thus the set of goals G is translated to a sequence of meta-variable declarations, which we also denote by G. Finally, we need a context to declare all the domain symbols and all free variables and meta-variables that occur in Σ, Γ and G. This yields the context Γ L . To show that [[Σ] ] is indeed a well-typed term of type A in Γ L , Γ, G requires some meta-theory of the type system, which we do not provide here. In the following, if we write a derivation Σ with A on top and B below it, we mean that A and B are part of the derivation Σ. Proof states can now be represented as well-formed contexts. For reuse we also introduce definitions of (meta-)variables.
If the last rule is (claim), then
Σ 1 B 1 . . . Σ n B n A]] such that Γ L , Γ 1 , G 1 i [[Σ 1 ]] : B.
Definition 17. The derivation rule for definitions is as follows:
The computation rules for definitions are by local instantiation and local unfolding. That is because in general we do not want to instantiate all metavariables at the same time (or unfold all definitions at the same time), but do that one by one. This reduction depends on the context Γ , where the definitions are recorded. If (n[y : A] := q : B) ∈ Γ , resp. (n := q : B) ∈ Γ , the rule reads as follows.
t(n[r])
where t(n) signifies one specific occurrence of n in t (and similarly for t (n[r] ). Details of extensions of type theory with an explicit definition mechanism can be found in [15] .
We illustrate how the type-theoretic contexts capture the notion of proof state by the following two examples.
Example 18. Consider the 'scratch-paper' example from Section 3. We can accomodate both the main derivation and the scratch derivation in one context. Let M be the term encoding the scratch derivation. The context now is as follows. A tactic transforms proof states. As proof states are formalized as contexts, tactics should be context transformers. As an example we show the 'apply' tactic.
Γ0, x[]
Example 19 (The Apply tactic).
Together with a goal to be proved, this tactic takes as inputs a proof of a universally quantified or implicational formula U and a list of terms/proofs. It applies elimination rules to U with the terms/proofs from the list, until a proof of the current goal B is obtained or no elimination rule is applicable. In the latter case the tactic fails. If the user has not made a decision on which terms/proofs to take, the system uses fresh meta-variables. Suppose Σ is some (open) derivation of U = ∀x.C 1 (x)→∀y.C 2 (x, y)→B(x) and we want to prove B(s). where Γ M : ∀x.C 1 (x)→∀y.C 2 (x, y)→B(x) represents the derivation Σ. Note the introduction and the use of the three new meta-variables h , h and y.
Conclusions and Further Work
In this paper we have formalized incomplete derivations in higher order predicate logic. By extending the Curry-Howard embedding to incomplete proofs we hope to have filled a gap that results from focusing the studies of incomplete objects exclusively to type theory. Among the topics that need to be investigated further is the question whether this framework is flexible enough to 'freely' do proofs in the way we like. This is a crucial point with respect to the practical applicability of interactive theorem proving. Related issues are the problems of finding a canonical set of basic tactics and tacticals that generate all (useful) tactics and the problems connected with viewing large proof states.
